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Documentation of CORTAX
CORTAX is applied in Bettendorf et al. (2006), a simulation study on the economic and welfare
implications of reforms in corporate income taxation. This technical documentation of the model
consists of the derivation and listing of the equations of the model and a justiﬁcation of the
calibration.Contents
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11 Technical description of the model
This memo documents version 7 of the model, which is used in in Bettendorf et al. (2006). The
ﬁrst chapter documents the derivation of the equations. The calibration of the model is described
in chapter 2. Section 1.1 derives the ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption and labour supply
from utility-maximising households. Section 1.2 derives from proﬁt maximisation, the demand
for labour, capital, location speciﬁc capital, intermediate inputs and ﬁnancial assets for domestic
and multinational ﬁrms. Taxes on corporate income, labour income, consumption and wealth are
introduced when appropriate. The tax revenues have to meet the government expenditures on
consumption, transfers and debt, see section 1.3. The market equilibria and the linkages with the
Rest of the World are presented in section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents the solution procedure.
Notation follows some simple rules. Upper case symbols are used for aggregated values
whereas lower case characters are reserved for per capita variables (in terms of the young
generation in the country of origin). In the case of variables with two dimensions, the ﬁrst index
refers to the country which owns the resource (residence), whereas the second index denotes the
using country (destination). Time subscripts and country indices are dropped in the exposition
whenever this is possible.
The rates of return on bonds (ˆ rwb) and equities (ˆ rwe) are assumed ﬁxed. The considered
countries are small in the sense that they can import (or export) capital from the Rest of the
World (ROW) without affecting the world interest rates. In other words, the net supply of capital
by the ROW is perfectly elastic. Multinationals are assumed to operate only in the other ‘small’
countries, but not in the ROW (and vice versa). The ROW block does not need to be fully
modelled. International capital and good ﬂows are restricted by the current account for each
country.
1.1 Households
The overlapping generations framework follows the standard Diamond model (see Heijdra and
Van der Ploeg (2002), Chapter 17). An individual is assumed to live for two periods: a working
period and a retirement period. In deviation from the standard Diamond model, we assume that
each period consist of T years. To keep the model tractable, we make a few simplifying
assumptions. First, the consumption share in income is assumed constant when young and when
old (i.e. within each period of T years). Since all income components grow at the annual rate ga,
consumption when young and when old grow at the same rate ga. Second, young individuals
supply the same amount of labour each year, independent of productivity growth. Old
individuals do not work and thus have only non-labour income. In sum, households have to
2choose consumption paths c
y
0(1+ga)s and co
0(1+ga)s for the s = 0,..,T −1 years in both
periods.
Both young and old individuals hold assets in bonds and equities.
1.1.1 Population
The generation sizes are denoted by Ny and No, respectively. Total population N = Ny +No
might differ over countries but the population growth rate gn is set identical for both countries
since we focus on the steady state. This implies Ny = (1+gn)TNo. The relative population size
is written as
ωn(i, j) ≡ Ny(i)/Ny(j) (1.1)
1.1.2 Consumption and labour supply
Labour supply has to be a constant fraction of the time endowment. Therefore, we have to
specify felicity v such that labour supply is constant even if productivity is growing. One option
is to assume log-utility in consumption combined with a unit elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, cf. Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (2002). A more ﬂexible approach, which we will






















1+αl σl = 1
(1.2)
where cy,o is consumption of goods, ˆ l is leisure, l = 1− ˆ l is labour supply, αl is the weight of
leisure and σl is the intratemporal substitution elasticity between consumption and leisure.1 We
assume that both consumption per capita and Al grow at rate ga. This implies that
vy(τ +1) = (1+ga)vy(τ). Equation (1.2) is combined with a similar expression for the ‘old’







































Wage income equals w(1−τl)l, where w denotes the gross wage rate, τl is the tax rate on
labour and ¯ w = w(1−τl) the after tax wage rate. When young, total income, consisting of wage
1 Sørensen (2001b) models labour supply differently by considering imperfect competition on the labour market. Unions
with monopoly power set the wage rate and working hours by maximizing its members’ expected consumer surplus from
work. Since the wage rate exceeds the market-clearing level, a fraction of the workers gets unvoluntary unemployed.
3income ¯ wl and lumpsum transfers try, is divided between consumption cy and savings (net of
interest income) sn, see (1.4). Households of the old generations receive transfers tro, the pure
proﬁts accruing to location speciﬁc capital2 πo and they dissave, see (1.5). We abstract from
bequests, such that households’ wealth equals zero at birth and death. Net savings for young
households are:
sy
n(t,t) = (1−τl)w(t)l +try(t)−(1+τc)cy(t) (1.4)
sy
n(t,t +τ) = (1+ga)
τsy
n(t,t) 0 ≤ τ < T
and similar for old households:
so
n(t,t +T) = πo(t +T)+tro(t +T)−(1+τc)co(t +T) (1.5)
so
n(t,t +T +τ) = (1+ga)
τso
n(t,t +T) 0 ≤ τ < T
Households accumulate wealth (assets a) according to:
a(t,t +τ) = ρsa(t,t +τ −1)+s
y
n(t,t +τ), 0 ≤ τ < T, a(t,t −1) = 0
a(t,t +τ) = ρsa(t,t +τ −1)+so
n(t,t +τ), T ≤ τ < 2T, a(t,t +2T −1) = 0
The wealth of the young generation accumulates as







s (1+ga)j, τ = 0,..T −1












Similarly, the wealth of the old generation decumulates as:











s (1+ga)j, τ = 0,..T −1
For wealth in the ﬁnal year (at age 2T), this implies:
a(t,t +2T −1) = ρT





















¯ w(t)l +try(t)−(1+τc)cy(t) = −




2 We assume that location speciﬁc capital (a ﬁxed factor) is owned by the old generation.
4Using the constant-growth assumption, we can write the budget equation for period t as:






Maximizing (1.3) subject to (1.8) yields the ﬁrst order conditions for cy, ˆ l and co, where λu












































The ﬁrst order conditions (1.10) and (1.11) imply that the marginal rate of substitution between





















Use the assumption of steady state growth, meaning that both c and v grow at rate ga, to rewrite















The portfolio consists of bonds and stocks, which are perceived as imperfect substitutes. Bonds
of different origin, yielding the same net interest rate (ρb), are considered perfect substitutes.
The same holds for domestic and foreign equities. Total wealth a is speciﬁed as a















where αs is a taste parameter and σs the substitution elasticity between bonds and stocks. The
total (after tax) return on the portfolio satisﬁes:
ρsa = ρbb+ρee (1.16)
3 Strictly speaking, a non-negative restriction on labour supply should be added. However, this restriction is normally not
binding in this case.
4 In the gams-program we ﬁx Al(0) = 1 in the base year.
5where ρx denotes the gross after tax rate of return on asset composite x (x = {s,b,e}). The
optimal portfolio composition is found by maximizing (1.16) subject to (1.15), where the























In the general case holds that b+e ≤ a, meaning that a fraction of wealth is lost in making the
aggregate.




αs ˆ ρσs +(1−αs)
G














αs ˆ ρσs +(1−αs)




G2 (1−αs)(1− ˆ ρ)
implying that
< 1












1.1.4 Taxation of portfolio income
Capital income is assumed to be only taxed in the country of residence. Tax authorities have full
information about these income ﬂows. Dividends, capital gains and interest income from bonds
are taxed at the rate τd, τg and τb, respectively.
The after-tax rate of return on bonds is then by deﬁnition equal to:
ρb = 1+rb = 1+ ˆ rwb(1−τb) (1.20)
where ˆ rwb is the world rate of return on bonds. The net return on equity re = ρe −1 will be
derived below in equation (1.53).
61.1.5 Aggregate consumption, wealth and savings (in a given period)
Aggregate consumption (per capita young) grows at rate ga if and only if
cy(t,t) = (1+ga)cy(t −1,t −1). We have already assumed that the consumption proﬁle for
each young person is cy(t −1,t) = (1+ga)cy(t −1,t −1). This implies that in a given period all
young persons (of every birth year) consume the same amount cy(t) and every old person












Aggregate wealth is less straightforward, as it is not uniform across generations. Observe from
equation (1.6) that for each household of the young generation holds:




















, i = 0,..T −1
where we deﬁne θ ≡ ρs/(1+ga). Similarly, for the old generation, using
a(t −i,t) = (1+ga)−ia(t,t +i) in equation (1.7) implies:

















































5 The assumptions on population in section 1.1.1 imply:
Ni(−s) =
(1+gn)−s











where s is the generation born s or T +s periods ago, Ni(−s) is the size of the s-year old age-cohort and ωy(−s) is the
relative size of this cohort (as fraction of the young population).
7such that in per capita terms:
as(t) = [ ¯ w(t)l +try(t)−cy(t)]χ (ga,gn,ρs) (1.23)
where χ is a (country-speciﬁc) parameter, depending on population growth, productivity growth
and the return on savings. This parameter does not depend on time, unlike Ny and sy. This
implies that aggregate savings including interest income are:







which equals zero if productivity and population growth are both zero.
Saving rate As an additional piece of evidence, we might use the saving rate to calibrate the
model. One common deﬁnition of the saving rate is savings as fraction of households disposable
income. Savings are deﬁned in equation (1.24). Disposable income is the sum over income of
young and old generations. Young households earn wage income, receive transfers and build up
assets for which they get interest income. Old households receive proﬁt-income, transfers and


















+(ρs −1)AS(t −1) (1.25)









χ(ga,gn,ρs)[ ¯ wl +try −(1−τc)cy]
¯ wl +try + πo+tro
(1+gn)T +(ρs −1)χ(ga,gn,ρs)[ ¯ wl +try −(1−τc)cy]
(1.26)
Compensating variation In simulations, we compare the welfare impact of tax changes by
calculating the compensating variation (cv). The cv is calculated as the change in transfers to
young households required to compensate the change in welfare. The system of equations used
to calculate cv consists of the deﬁnition of welfare in (1.2) and (1.3), the optimal response of
labour and consumption in (1.13) and (1.14), and the budget equation (1.9).
The interpretation of the cv is hampered by the fact that a welfare gain is represented by a
negative compensation. In the output tables we overcome this by reporting the cvgain ≡ −100cv
y ,
where y is GDP in the base case.
81.2 Firms
Three types of ﬁrms are active in each country: pure domestic ﬁrms, headquarters of
multinationals and subsidiaries of foreign multinationals. Firm’s types are represented by the
superscripts d, m and f, respectively. Each country is endowed with a stock of a ﬁxed factor,
named ‘location speciﬁc capital’. Its size is assumed proportional to the generation size Ny to
avoid that productivity differentials would arise from differences in country size (cfr. Sørensen
(2001a), p. 7). To be precise, this factor is called ﬁxed since its supply is perfectly inelastic. An
individual ﬁrm can choose the amount of this factor optimally. In equilibrium, the ﬁxed factor is
paid its marginal productivity. The three ﬁrm types are successively discussed in the following
paragraphs. The last paragraph describes corporate taxation.
1.2.1 Domestic ﬁrms
The marginal investor maximises the present value of the representative ﬁrm, which is equal to
the discounted stream of dividends. As will be clear shortly, the discount rate of investors
residing in different countries differs due to varying tax rates on capital income. It implies that
the present value differs between investors. To single out a unique investor, we assume that the
marginal investor is domestic.






where ˆ rwe is the world rate of return on equity, Vd is the value of the ﬁrm and Divd the
distributed proﬁts. The net return on equity re(i, j) = ρe(i, j)−1 follows from subtracting
personal taxes:
re(i, j)Vd


















The second line follows from the assumption that each investor irrespective of its residence
country receives the same dividend and capital gain per share, with Divd(j) = åiDivd(i, j) and
Vd(j) = åiVd(i, j). This equation shows that investors who face different tax rates will value
ﬁrms differently. In principle, investors who require the lowest net return are willing to pay the
most for an equity. Under the assumption that the marginal investor is domestic (i = j), recursive


















where ¯ re represents the discount rate relevant for ﬁrm’s decisions. From here onward, we drop
the country index, since both the ﬁrm and the marginal investor reside in country j.
Production function Maximization of the ﬁrm’s value requires that an expression for the
dividends is derived.6 The ﬁrst key ingredient is the production function. For the representative












whereYd denotes total output, Ad the output contribution of the ﬁxed factor, VAd value-added
and αd
v the share of value-added in production. The exogenous fraction of the ﬁxed factor that is
in use by domestic corporations is denoted by ωd. Value-added is a CES-function of
























v• is a share parameter and σd
v is the substitution elasticity between labour and capital.
The total factor productivity (TFP) level A0 serves two purposes: it facilitates the calibration of
GDP and it allows for the introduction of productivity growth. We assume that TFP is uniform
within a country across the three ﬁrm-types. In addition, we assume that its growth rate ga is
uniform across countries. We impose steady growth with gk = gy and employment growth equal
to population growth gn. Equations (1.30) and (1.31) implies gy = gva = (1+ga)(1+gn)−1.7







































Debt or equity ﬁnancing The second ingredient for the expression of dividends is the
determination of the debt ratio. Investment can be ﬁnanced by issuing bonds or by retaining
6 The following analysis can be found in e.g. Salinger and Summers (1983).
7 The growth rate gy applies on the steady growth path to Y,wL,D,I,P, ˆ P,Div.
10proﬁts (issuing new shares is not considered).8 The gross world rates of return on bonds and
equities are denoted by ˆ rwb and ˆ rwe, respectively. First, an interior solution for the ﬁnancing mix











b,0 i = d,m, f with χ0,εb > 0 (1.34)
where di
b is the ﬁrm’s debt-asset ratio and ci
b is the cost of ﬁnancial distress per unit of capital.
This cost represents the output which is lost as ﬁnancial decisions distract managers from









































This implies that the cost function has its minimum at:
di







b,0 is used to set this minimum equal to zero, we can calibrate the actual debt-asset ratio
with the parameters εb and χ0. The sensitivity of the cost function w.r.t. changes in the debt-ratio
will depend on both parameters, but mainly on χ0, whereas εb ﬁrst of all represents the debt rate
at which ﬁnancial distress costs are minimized.
Dividends The tax base b Pd of corporate taxation is deﬁned as:







where βb is the deductible fraction of interest payments, δt the depreciation rate of capital for tax
purposes and Dd the stock of depreciation allowances.9 When exponential depreciation is
allowed for tax purposes, the accumulation of depreciation rights is similarly speciﬁed as the









8 In the model of Auerbach and King (1983) individual ﬁrms will either choose debt or equity ﬁnancing, but an interior
solution with both debt and equity ﬁnancing at the ﬁrm-level requires very strong restrictions. At the industry or
macro-level, an interior solution is feasible if ﬁrms are heterogenous, with varying preference for debt or equity ﬁnancing
(like with varying risk aversion).
9 Notice that the tax base includes ﬁxed-factor income, which justiﬁes a positive corporate tax rate.
11where Id stands for investment and δk for the real depreciation rate10. Corporate taxes are equal
to τ d




















where Pd denote returns to ﬁxed factors.
Proﬁt maximization The ﬁrm is assumed to maximize its value (1.29), subject to the
























The ﬁrst order condition of Ld gives the familiar marginal productivity condition:
∂Yd
∂Ld = w (1.41)
With the CRS production function and perfect competition, each production factor is paid its

































































generally implies that dd
b > εb and ∂cd
b/∂dd
b > 0.12 The ﬁrst order condition of investment gives
λd +µd = L (1.44)
10 The speciﬁcation (1.37) yields a similar optimal condition for capital as in Sørensen (2001b). One could favour a
change of the time index for investment into t +1.











Normally holds that r > gy and δt > δk, implying that the tax allowance in OECDTAX is larger (for a given K).
12 Instead of ¯ re, Sørensen (2001b) uses ˆ re in the equivalent of (1.43). Normally, ¯ re < ˆ re holds.














which is the present value of the stream of depreciation allowances for one unit of capital.






























Use (1.44) to simplify this expression to:
∂Yd
∂Kd = cd (1.48)
where we deﬁne the user cost of capital stock cd and the marginal cost of ﬁnance rd as:13
cd ≡


















The value of the ﬁrm is shown to be equal to the sum of the values of the physical and the
accounting stock of capital, see Salinger and Summers (1983, eq. (14)):
Vd = L(1−dd
b)Kd +λd(Dd −Kd) (1.51)






























t Rt−1 = 0






































t Rt−1 = 0
13 Notice that the only difference with the corresponding condition (69) in Sørensen (2001b) concerns the effect of
depreciation allowances. Whereas the discount rate rd is assumed for depreciation allowances in OECDTAX, the rate ¯ re
applies in our dynamic context.
















































t Rt = 0















































As dividends grow at rate gy = (1+ga)(1+gn)−1 at the steady growth path, an alternative




with ¯ re > gy (1.52)
Furthermore, 4Vd = gyVd in the steady state implies Divd/Vd = ˆ rwe −gy in view of (1.27).
Substitution in (1.28) yields:
re(i, j) = (1−τd(i))(ˆ rwe(j)−gy)+(1−τg(i))gy (1.53)
¯ re(j) = L(j)ˆ rwe(j)+(1−L(j))gy (1.54)
1.2.2 Multinational parent company
The domestic operations of the multinationals are analogously speciﬁed:
Ym = Am (VAm)
αm
v with 0 < αm
v < 1 (1.55)
whereYm denotes total output, Am the output contribution of the ﬁxed factor, and VAm
value-added. Multinationals hold fraction ωm = 1−ωd of the ﬁxed factor. Value-added is a






















Marginal productivities are similar to (1.32) and (1.33). When the corporation’s debt-asset ratio
dm




b ) ¯ re +(1−τ m
π )cm
b (1.58)
14The parent company supplies Q(j) units as an input to its foreign subsidiary j. When the tax
rate on proﬁts differs between both countries, transfer pricing might be attractive to shift taxable
proﬁts between the jurisdictions (Sørensen (2001b), p. 24). However, charging a different price
than the real cost (i.e. pq 6= 1) involves a type of organizational costs. The cost arising from a









= sign(pq −1)|pq −1|
εq
The corporate tax base is given by




b )Km −δtDm (1.60)























The optimal decisions of multinationals follow from the maximization of its total value, which is
described in the following paragraph.
1.2.3 Multinational subsidiaries
Production of the subsidiary in country j is given by:






v with 0 < αq +α f


































whereY f denotes total output, Af the output contribution of the ﬁxed factor, Q the intermediate
input and VAf value-added.
The equity of the subsidiary is assumed to be completely provided by its parent, implying
that the equity cost equals the opportunity cost in the parent’s country (¯ re(i)). The multinational
ﬁnances the remaining fraction of the capital stock by issuing bonds at the cost ˆ rwb. The
subsidiary’s marginal cost of ﬁnance is written as
r f(j) ≡ d
f














15where ﬁnancial distress costs c
f
b are deﬁned in equation (1.34). Its tax base is deﬁned according






























































































































































Pf(j) = (1−αq −α f
v )(1−τ f
π (j))Y f(j) (1.76)
14 Pure proﬁts of foreign subsidairies are assumed to accrue to the old generation living in the parent country.

























, i = m, f (1.77)




















π ) = τ f
π (j)−τ m
π (1.79)
From the last condition follows that the multinational shifts proﬁts to the jurisdiction with the
lowest tax rate, since pq(j) > (<)1 if τ
f
π (j) > (<)τ m
π .
The ﬁrst order conditions also imply that the value of the multinational equals the value of







b (j))K f(j)+λ f(j)(D f(j)−K f(j))
i
(1.80)


























λ f(j)(D f(j)−K f(j))
Using (1.68) completes the proof.






b )Km +λm(Dm −Km)+
L(1−τ m
π )




























K f(i, j) (1.83)
171.2.4 Aggregate production
Gross domestic product is deﬁned as the sum of production of all ﬁrms in a country corrected for






1.2.5 Taxation of corporate income
We assume that corporate income is only taxed in the source country:
τ d
π (i) = τ m
π (i) = τ f
π (j,i) = τπ(i) (1.85)
The focus on this pure regime can be motivated by the observation in Devereux (2004) that
‘Although in many countries the legal basis of taxation is on a residence basis, in practice the
vast bulk of the international taxation of company equity income is on a source basis’. He also
states that only little revenue is raised in the residence country.
A system that follows the source principle is equivalent to the exemption system from
Sørensen (2001b) in the absence of an equalization tax and the full exemption of foreign source
income (i.e. DE = 0 and Dee = 1 in (100)). These latter two features are indeed of minor
importance in practice. All countries operating this system exempt almost all foreign source
income from home country tax (Dee > 0.95), whereas the equalization tax only exists in Finland
and France. The exemption system is applied at all ﬂows within the EU, except by Greece,
Ireland and the UK.
For calibration as well as for output purposes, the effective tax rate is calculated. An effective
tax rate is deﬁned as the relative difference between pre and post tax capital costs. The effective
marginal tax rate (τ x
e ) is relevant for marginal investment decisions. In our model the effective
marginal tax rate equals:
τ x
e =
cx −(cx|τπ = 0)
cx , x = d,m, f (1.86)
where cx is deﬁned in (1.49), (1.73) and (1.74).
1.3 Government
Tax bases regarding dividends and capital gains are aggregated over the ﬁrm types as:
Div(i, j) = Divd(i, j)+Divm(i, j) = (ˆ rwe −gy)E(i, j) (1.87)
4V(i, j) = 4Vd(i, j)+4Vm(i, j) = gyE(i, j) (1.88)
with E(i, j) = e(i, j)No(i). Government consumption is assumed a ﬁxed fraction ωg of GDP
(deﬁned in 1.84). The government debt Dg is assumed to be a ﬁxed fraction of GDP:
18Dg(i) = ¯ dg(i)Y (i). The issue of new debt due to economic growth covers the deﬁcit of the
government:
gy ¯ dg(i)Y (i)+τl(i)w(i)L(i)+τc(i)[Cy (i)+Co(i)]+
τπ(i)
h




τd(i)åjDiv(i, j)+τg(i)åj4V(i, j)+τb(i)åj ˆ rwbB(i, j)
= ωg(i)Y(i)+try(i)Ny(i)+tro(i)No(i)+ ˆ rwb ¯ dg(i)Y (i)
In the following we will express variables in per capita terms (denoted by lower case symbols),









ˆ πd(i)+ ˆ πm(i)
i
Ny(i)+τπ(i)åj6=i ˆ π f(j,i)Ny(j)+
[τd(i)(ˆ rwe −gy)e(i)+τg(i)gye(i)+τb(i)ˆ rwbb(i)]No(i) (1.89)
= ωg(i)y(i)Ny(i)+try(i)Ny(i)+tro(i)No(i)+(ˆ rwb−gy) ¯ dg(i)y(i)Ny(i)
1.4 Market Equilibria
1.4.1 Good markets
The total capital stock in country i is obtained by taking the sum over all active ﬁrms:
K(i) ≡ Kd(i)+Km(i)+åj6=iK f(j,i)



















No = π (1+gn)
T.
19where EX denotes total net exports of the ﬁnal good, i.e. exclusive of Q (note that gross bilateral
exports are undetermined). The last term at the right-hand side represents the resources which
are lost in making the saving composite. In per capita terms the steady state equation for good
market equilibrium, noting that both population and productivity grow, becomes:
y(i) = cy(i)+
co(i)
(1+gn)T +k(i)(1+gy)−(1−δk −cb(i))k(i)+åj6=i(1+cq(i, j))q(i, j)+
ωg(i)y(i)+ex(i)+s(i)−b(i)−e(i) (1.91)
1.4.2 Factor markets
Since domestic and foreign assets are assumed perfect substitutes, net foreign holdings of bonds








b (j,i)K f(j,i)+ ¯ dg(i)Y (i) (1.92)
e(i)No(i)+ew(i)Ny(i) =Vd(i)+Vm(i) (1.93)
When a country wants to issue more bonds than it holds, foreigners are willing to hold the excess
amount (bw > 0) at the given world interest rate. Analogously, domestic residents own part of
the foreign ﬁrms when ew < 0. Labour supply should equal total demand for labour, or:
ld(i)+lm(i)+åj6=il f(j,i)ωn(j,i) = l(i) (1.94)
Extension: In the basic version the world interest rates are exogenous. In an extended
version, the interest rates on bonds and equity are endogenized by postulating a simple reduced
form. For each asset, a linear relation between the world interest rate and net capital demand of
the EU is speciﬁed:
ˆ rwx = γ0x
åxw(i)Ny(i)
åy(i)Ny(i)
+γ1x, x = b,e (1.95)
1.4.3 Balance of Payments
Net foreign assets are deﬁned as the value of the assets a country owns minus the total value of
all assets issued by that country:











Using equilibrium on the capital market in (1.92) and (1.93), one can derive an alternative





20The Current Account equals the Trade Balance plus net foreign earnings on bonds, equities and
FDI:
CA(i) = −ˆ rwbBw(i)− ˆ rweEw(i)
+åj6=i
h
ˆ rweVmf(i, j)+Pf(i, j)− ˆ rweVmf(j,i)−Pf(j,i)
i
+EX(i)+åj6=i[pq(i, j)Q(i, j)− pq(j,i)Q(j,i)]
In view of the Balance of Payments deﬁnition FAt+1 = (1+gy)FAt = CAt +FAt one gets:
−(ˆ rwb−gy)Bw(i)−(ˆ rwe −gy)Ew(i)+
åj6=i
h
(ˆ rwe −gy)Vmf(i, j)+Pf(i, j)−(ˆ rwe −gy)Vmf(j,i)−Pf(j,i)
i
+
EX(i)+åj6=i[pq(i, j)Q(i, j)− pq(j,i)Q(j,i)] = 0
The per capita expression is easily obtained:
−(ˆ rwb−gy)bw(i)−(ˆ rwe −gy)ew(i)+
åj6=i
h





(ˆ rwe −gy)vmf(j,i)+π f(j,i)+ pq(j,i)q(j,i)
i
ωn(j,i)+ex(i) = 0 (1.96)
where ωn(j,i) ≡ Ny(j)/Ny(i) is a short-cut for the relative population sizes.
1.5 Solution method
The model is implemented in GAMS.16. It is solved as a Constrained Nonlinear System, for
which the number of equations has to equal the number of variables.17 The price of the good is
taken as the numeraire. Due to Walras law, one of the equations is redundant. In the
GAMS-program the balance of payments condition (1.96) is dropped but checked afterwards.
16 Knowledge of the brief GAMS tutorial is sufﬁcient for understanding the computer program.
17 Technical documentation can be found in www.gams.com/docs/pdf/cns.pdf or in www.gams.com/solvers/conopt.pdf
(Appendix A13.2). This method does not allow that variables are at their bounds in the solution.
212 Calibration
This chapter starts with a discussion of the data sources. The ﬁrst section discusses the
calibration of the household block. Section 2.2 motivates the choices in the calibration of the
production block. Section 2.3 presents the ﬁgures for government expenditures and revenues
used in the model.
The main data sources in the calibration are:
NA National accounts, OECD, July 2005
• Table 1: GDP, expenditure approach
• Table 3: GDP, income approach
• Table 5: Population and employment
• Table 12: Simpliﬁed general government accounts
The NA-data are converted in Euro’s using PPP’s. These PPP’s are provided by the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre (see www.ggdc.nl) based on OECD-data, see
www.oecd.org/std/ppp.
RS Revenue Statistics 1965-2004, OECD
FDI International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 2003, OECD
UN United Nations Population Division (2000), World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
(CD Rom). We use data on the sizes of 5-year age classes for the period 1950-2000
GGDC Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, 2005
We have used 2002 as benchmark year, which is the ﬁnal date for which all data is available.




Total population and population growth are obtained from UN. Total population N is deﬁned as
the sum of all groups older than 20 years. Population growth gn is deﬁned as the growth of N in
2000, see equation (2.1) below, which implies gn ≈ 0.5%. Given the Diamond OLG-structure of
the model, we divide the population in two cohorts of age 20-60 and of age 60-100, such that the
cohort lenght T = 40.
22Discussion Observations on population dynamics do not fully match with two model features.
First, a steady state growth is imposed. Second, the age of death is known with certainty. All
persons know that they will live exactly 2∗T years. Two approaches are possible to calibrate the
growth rate gn. The ﬁrst approach interprets gn as the (annual) net population growth rate, which





The second approach is based on the population structure in the steady state:
Ny = (1+gn)
T No (2.2)







The two alternative measures are calculated for 22 countries and presented for 2000 in Figure
2.1.18 To reproduce the population structure observed in 2000, a high value for gn results from
(2.3). Applying (2.1) yields the moderate growth rates experienced during the last years. We
prefer the ﬁrst approach. This choice has as drawback that the simulated relative size of the
young generation will be smaller than observed.
Finally, since we have constrained the population growth rate gn the same in all countries (in
the steady state), we have to calculate an average over the countries. The EU-averages, weighted
with the population sizes N, are given in Table 2.1.












18 The calculations are performed in spreadsheet WPP2000_1950-2000_TAXBEN.xls. The raw data are found in
the range A16-AA1139; the calculations in AC16-AL1139. The ﬁgure and table for 2000 are made from AT1118-AW1137.
23Figure 2.1 Calibration of gn in 2000




















based on age structure net growth rate
E number of employees and selfemployed. Source: NA, T5: employment in persons
h hours worked per person. Source: GGDC
LF labor force. Source: UN, population 15-64
Potential hours is deﬁned as the labor-force times a maximum of 2500 hours per year. This
leads to a labor-supply measure between 0.38 for France and 0.51 in the Czech Republic. The
implied parameter for the preference-for-leisure αl ranges between 0.87 in Sweden and 1.55 in
Italy, which is well in line with Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), see Table 2.3.
Evers et al. (2005) has surveyed the empirical literature on the responsiveness of labor supply
to changes in the wage rate. Based on a meta analysis they conclude that the uncompensated
wage elasticity (εL = dlnl/dlnw) is about 0.1 for man and 0.5 for woman. Our simulated wage
elasticity for all workers, using the partial model for household behavior, ﬁts nicely in this range,
see Figure 2.2.
2.1.3 Consumption, savings and disposable income
Disposable income depends on after-tax labor income, capital income and transfers, see equation
(1.25). These determinants of income are discussed below in the sections on ﬁrms and
government. For given disposable income and by ﬁxing parameters on preferences (like the rate
of time preference, the inter- and intratemporal substitution elasticities, see Table 2.2)
consumption in both periods is determined by the model. The relation of the resulting aggregate
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consumption (c_model) with "Household ﬁnal consumption expenditure" from NA, T1 (c_na),
both as shares of GDP, is shown in ﬁgure 2.3. The correlation between the model outcome with
the data is 0.67. The weighted mean of aggregate consumption (as share of GDP) is slightly
lower in the model (0.53) than in the data (0.58).
We ﬁx the rate of time preference at 1.01 such that ρu < ρs(i), ∀i. We ﬁx ρo = 1, as it
implies equal weight on felicity of both generations. We ﬁx the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution σu = 0.5 in line with CPB (2004). This combination of parameters implies that the
saving rate (8% on average) is slightly higher than the saving rate from OECD19 (7%). Note that
we do not want to match the country variation in saving rates, as these are likely to ﬂuctuate
signiﬁcantly over time. Moreover, the implied net foreign asset position of −12%-GDP
(EU-average) approximates the average for the European countries −7%, as given by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2006).
Discussion Data on household consumption is obtained from NA, T1: "Household ﬁnal
consumption expenditure". This matches in the model with aggregate consumptionC(i) deﬁned
as:
C(i) = Ny (i)cy (i)+No(i)co(i) (2.4)
19 See Table 2: standard and adjusted saving rates (average 1998-2003) from OECD ECO/CPE/WP1 (2005), Comparing
household saving rates across OECD countries.
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A second piece of evidence are the saving rates, which are available for most, but not all
countries, from OECD (2005), see footnote 19.
Household consumption is in the model determined by the budget equation (1.8) and the
Euler equation (1.14). We have considered three ways to determine the consumption proﬁle of
households. The ﬁrst route is to assume that the consumption proﬁle should match both the
budget equation (1.8) and equation (2.4). The preference parameter ρo(i) can then be used to
match this consumption proﬁle in the Euler equation. The second route is to assume that the
consumption proﬁle should match the budget equation and the country-speciﬁc saving rates,
where again the Euler equation solves for ρo. The drawback of both alternatives is that the
resulting preferences parameter ρo is very heterogenous. In addition, the ﬁrst route would
mismatch the saving rates and the second route would mismatch aggregate consumption. We
prefer a third route, where we avoid the extreme variation in preferences by ﬁxing ρu = 1.01 and
ρo = 1 at the expense that the country-variation in consumption cannot be exactly reproduced.
2.1.4 Portfolio
We ﬁx αs = 0.7 and σs = 4. The resulting share of bonds in households portfolio is about 0.69
without much variation between countries. This share is in line with the available evidence for
the US: Poterba and Samwick (2003, Table 4) show that US-households hold 34.7% of their
wealth as equity, 50.6% as bonds or interest bearing accounts and 14.7% as other ﬁnancial
26assets. Chambers and Schlagenhauf (2002) show that US households hold 52.4% as cash, 19.5%
as bonds and 28% as equity. Following Sørensen (2001b), we assume that households can
relatively easily substitute between both assets, by ﬁxing σs = 4.
In the last three years, the real interest rate, deﬁned as the 30-years real bonds (obtained from
www.aft.gouv.fr/IMG/xls/0512_rendements_indexees.xls) have declined from 2.7% in january
2003 to 1.6% in november 2005, see Figure 2.4. We ﬁx ˆ rwb at 2%, slightly below the average of
2.2% for 2003-2005. The risk premium too has fallen in recent years, which has led us to choose
a relatively modest 2% such that ˆ rwe = 4%. What matters for households portfolio decisions is
of course the after-tax return on bonds and and equity. The taxation of portfolio will be
discussed in section 2.3.
2.1.5 Extension with endogenous interest rates
For the extended version, we need to calibrate the parameters of (1.95). Table III.2 in European
Commission (2004) reports that one additional GDP point of debt raises real interest rates by 1
basis point. Therefore, we ﬁx γ0x = 0.01 (x = b,e). The constant term γ1x is used to reproduce
the gross interest rates of the base case (ˆ rwx).



























































































































































27Table 2.2 Calibrating household behavior – parameters
Parameter Value Determined by



















Table 2.3 Parameter values in the literature
(M)a (1)b (2)b (3)b (4)b (5)b
Technological growth 1.5% 1.5% 2% 1.37% 3%
Rate of time preference 1.0% 1.0% 2% 1% 1.5%
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.5 0.5 0.25 1.00 0.25
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution 1.0 0.3 0.71 - 0.8
Preference for leisure 0.88-1.56 1.5
Elasticity of substitution between L and K 0.7 0.5 1.0
Debt-capital ratio (ﬁrms) 0.45-0.55 0.5 0.44 0.14-0.50
Economic depreciation of capital 5.0% 11.5% 10.00% 1.0-8.9%
Fiscal depreciation of capital 5.0-15.0% 5.5% 14.47% 7.0-17.9%
Real return on bonds 2% 2.5% 3% 1.1%
Risk premium for equity 2% 2.0% 4% 6.2-11.8%
a (M) parameter value in CORTAX;
b Source: (1) CPB (2004); (2) Broer (1999), Appendix 3; (3) Dietz and Keuschnigg (2003), Table 1; (4) Goulder and Summers (1987),
Table 2; (5) Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Chapter 4.
2.2 Firms






28where the number of self-employed (ES) and dependent employment (EE) are taken from NA,






whereY is GDP and TS is "Taxes less subsidies on production and imports" from NA, T3.
Implausible low values are corrected by putting a minimum on ωL > 0.6, which is binding for
IRL and CZE. The resulting wage share is shown in Figure 2.5. The labor-income share
determines the wage rate per hour worked w(i) = ωl(i)y(i)/l(i) and is a key factor in the
calibration of the capital-share in the production function αvk (i). The latter guarantees that the
marginal productivity of capital equals the cost of capital, see (1.49).
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GDP and productivity Gross Domestic Product is taken from NA, T1 and is assumed to be the
sum of production of domestic and multinational ﬁrms, see equation (1.84). We have no
information on the division of GDP over the three elements. We therefore have to ﬁx the
parameters ωd (at 0.7 as in Sørensen (2001b)) and ωm 
= 1−ωd
, but we can use information
on FDI-stocks to determine ω f (see below).
Two production function parameters are country speciﬁc (but uniform across ﬁrms within
each country), namely the capital share αvk and total factor productivity A0. The remaining
29parameters are assumed to be uniform, both across countries and across ﬁrm types, see Table
2.5. Aggregate GDP is matched in the model by variation in the parameter A0(i). The
country-speciﬁc productivity parameter A0(i) ranges from 0.44 in the Czech Republic to 0.94 in
Belgium/Luxembourg and the UK.20
We assume that productivity grows at rate ga = 1.5% in all countries. Together with the
population growth of 0.5%, it implies that GDP grows at rate gy = 2.0%.
Discussion Chirinko (2002) surveys the empirical literature on the substitution elasticity
between labor and capital in the US. First, he points at the wide range of estimates. Estimates
range from less than 0.3 using aggregate investment data, 0.25-0.5 using ﬁrm-level panel data, to
0.4-0.9 with cointegration estimates on capital and its user cost. In a recent study for the US,
Antràs (2004) argues that after controlling for biased technological change, σv is likely to be
considerably below one, and may even be lower than 0.5. In a cross-section for 28
manufacturing sectors in 34 countries, Claro (2003) concludes that σv is generally close to, but
signiﬁcantly different from one. In a panel regression for 82 countries, Duffy and Papageorgiou
(2000) observes that σv is higher in rich countries and might even exceed one.
The Joint Committee on Taxation in the US has developed two CGE models for the analysis
of taxation, named the MEG model and the OLG model. They set σv = 1 in the MEG model, but
add that the substitution elasticity between capital and labor is likely to be overstated relative to
existing estimates of the substitution between capital and labor, see Joint Committee on Taxation
(2003, p.42). For the OLG model, they use σv = 0.5 for the private business sector.
As most empirical studies point at an elasticity of substitution well below unity, we ﬁx
σv = 0.7, where we take into account that our modelling horizon is the long run, which likely
facilitates the substitution between labor and capital.
Chirinko (2002) shows that the analysis of tax policy is very sensitive to the assumption on
σv. Following his suggestion, we undertake tax policy analysis with alternative parameter values.
Capital and investment The capital stock follows from the data on GDP, employment and the
wage share and on assumptions about the depreciation rate, the rental rate and others. The
resulting capital-output ratio ﬂuctuates between 2.5 (PRT) and 4.5 (IRL).
In the steady state, investment has to compensate for capital depreciation and economic
growth. Compared to the investment rate from the National Accounts, calculated as Gross
Capital Formation as share of GDP (both from NA, T1), the resulting share in the model exceeds
the observed share. In the model, the investment share ﬂuctuates between 18% (PRT) and 32%
(IRL).
20 Only the variation, not the absolute value of A0 is informative. To be clear, a value of A0 = 1 does not act as benchmark.
30FDI The FDI stocks data for most OECD countries originate from FDI. The data set covers 29
OECD-countries and around 70 partner countries for 1980 until 2002. From this source two
types of data have been used: outward and inward position or stocks. Moreover remaining EU25
countries are obtained from EUROSTAT. From that source we have downloaded the
corresponding total direct investments, positions abroad and in the reporting economy
respectively. For further details, we refer to the upcomming CPB memorandum by Van Leeuwen
and Lejour on ‘FDI by country and sector’.







i,j , where the debt share d and the capital-labor ratio kl are calculated
in earlier steps of the calibration and where llow
i,j = 10−7 is the lower bound of employment in
subsidaries. A second adjustment we have made is for the FDI of Belgium/Luxembourg, for
which only inward FDI is incompletely available. Without correction, the inward FDI would be
much higher in BLU (49%GDP) than in NLD (34%GDP) and the share of labor in domestic
ﬁrms would be very low (27% in BLU, versus 73% in NLD). We have halved the original
FDI-stocks in BLU, such that the share of inward FDI (25%GDP) and the domestic labor shares
(77%) are similar to that of the Netherlands. The resulting total inward and outward FDI-stocks,
both as shares of GDP, are shown in Figure 2.6.
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v with 0 < αq +α f
v < 1 (2.7)
with 1−α
f
v −αq = 0.025. We use the parameter ω f, measuring the ﬁxed input in production, to
calibrate the FDI-stocks.
Tax elasticity of FDI From a meta study of 25 studies containing 371 estimates, De Mooij and
Ederveen (2003) report a typical semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to the average tax rate of
−2.4 (see De Mooij (2005, Table 2)).21 Figure 2.7 shows the impact of a (series of) unilateral
reduction in the statutory tax rate on a countries inward FDI in a simulation with only the
production-side of the model. Our simulated semi-elasticity is smaller than the mean value of
the meta study, but ﬁts in the range of estimated values, see De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, ﬁg.
4.1).22
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%
21 In a recent unpublished update of their paper they report a somewhat higher semi-elasticity of −4.3. Their study,
however, also includes empirical estimates for US-statelevel data, which might overestimate the semi-elasticity for
FDI-responses between countries.
22 The semi-elasticity is calculated in a partial model for production, with exogenous labour supply but endogenous





vk , or to reduce the debt ratio of multinationals relative to domestic ﬁrms ε
m,f
b < εd
b . However, we do not have
any empirical support for both adjustments.
32Transfer pricing Clausing (2003) estimates the effect on transfer prices of intraﬁrm trade of
US multinationals. She ﬁnds that a 10% point lower tax rate in the host country reduces the
intraﬁrm import price by 3 to 5%. The intraﬁrm export price of the afﬁliate increases by a similar
amount. However, Swenson (2001, p. 17) reports a much smaller impact. A 10% point reduction
in the foreign corporate tax rate increases the import price of afﬁliated US ﬁrms by only 0.048%.
Evidence on the elasticity of proﬁt shifting is given by Huizinga and Laeven (2006), who ﬁnd
a macro semi-elasticity of reported proﬁts with respect to the top statutory tax rate of 1.43 in
Europe. In the model multinationals can only shift proﬁts by applying transfer prices to
intra-ﬁrm ﬂows of intermediates. To capture the more general practice of proﬁt shifting, we
model transfer prices more sensitive to tax rate differentials by ﬁxing εq = 1. Figure 2.8 shows
the impact of a unilateral tax reduction on the exporting transfer price. The ﬁgure reveals that a
1%-point reduction in the corporate tax rate leads to a 1.6% increase in proﬁts shifted via
transfer pricing.
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Debt-asset ratio We rely on ECB-ﬁgures to calibrate our debt-asset ratio. ECB (2004) shows
in chart 5 that the debt-equity ratio has ﬂuctuated from 90% in 1995 via 50% in 1999 to 80% in
2002 and 2003. The implied debt-asset ratios, assuming that debt+equity=assets, has ﬂuctuated
between 47% in 1995 via 33% in 1999 to 44% in 2002 and 2003.
The second piece of information we use in the calibration of the portfolio cost function is the
33Table 2.4 Corporate taxation and debt policya
study sample d(d)/d(τπ)
Graham et al. (1998)b pool of large US ﬁrms, 1981-1992 (p. 153) 0.028
Graham (1999)c pool of large US ﬁrms, 1980-1994
estimation in levels (Table 3a) 0.061
estimation in differences (Table 7A) 0.024
Gordon and Lee (2001) all US ﬁrms, 1954-1995
pooled estimation (Fig. 3) 0.3-0.45
time-series estimates (Table 5) 0.362
Desai et al. (2004)d afﬁliates of US multinationals in more than
150 countries in 1982, 1989 & 1994
total borrowing (Table II(1)) 0.265
external borrowing (Table III(5)) 0.246
a Auerbach (2002, section 3.3.2) and Graham (2003, section 1.3) give a review of the literature but without mentioning a single estimated
value.
b Dietz and Keuschnigg (2003) use a value of 0.36, while referring to Graham et al. (1998).












where taxbenefit is deﬁned in (3) and τc denotes the (before-ﬁnancing) marginal federal tax rate. The ﬁrst term is taken from the Tables
of estimates, while the average τe is found in Table 2B. Notice that the personal tax rates and the effective corporate state tax (p. 155)
are assumed constant.
d Desai et al. (2004) report that the implied (full) elasticity of external borrowing equals 0.19, while the elasticity of parent borrowing is
larger at 0.35 (p. 15).
tax elasticity of the debt-ratio. Table 2.4 surveys the literature on the impact of tax changes (or
tax differentials) on the debt-ratio of ﬁrms. The semi-elasticities range from 0.02 to 0.45.
The debt-asset ratio in our model is determined mainly by equations (1.34) and (1.43) for
domestic ﬁrms (and similar equations for multinationals), implying that the parameters εb and χ0
crucially determine the debt-asset ratio and its tax-elasticity. We ﬁx εb = 0.35 and χ0 = 0.025
such that the debt-equity ratio in our model ranges between 45% in IRL to 55% in CZE, GRC,
with a mean of 51%. The simulated semi-elasticity (using the partial model of ﬁrm behaviour) of
0.35 (ﬂuctuating between 0.22 in IRL and 0.38 in DEU, ITA) falls nicely in the range of
semi-elasticities.23
The calibration of the production-parameters are summarised in Table 2.5.
23 A higher value of εb would imply higher values for the calibrated debt-asset ratios. A higher value of χ0 would increase
the tax elasticity and enlarge the range of simulated ratios.
34Table 2.5 Calibration of the production block
parameter value determined by (or used to match)
Production ωL (0.60,0.77) (2.6)
αvk (0.27,0.60) (1.49)
Ao (0.43,0.94) (1.84)











Debt-equity ﬁnancing εb 0.35
χo 0.025
Transfer pricing εq 1.0
2.3 Government: expenditures and taxes
The government expenditures consist of the following components:
1. Government consumption, represented as share of GDP as ωg: calculated from NA, T1 as "Final
consumption expenditure" minus "Household ﬁnal consumption expenditure".
2. Government investment, also included in ωg: calculated from the government account, NA, T12,
as "Gross capital formation".
3. Interest payments on government debt is calculated as ˆ rwb ¯ dgy, where government debt as ratio
from GDP is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook 77.
4. Transfers to households, Nytry +Notro: calculated as the residual of the government budget
equation. We assume that 43% of the transfers accrue to the old generation.
To get an impression of the division of transfers between young and old generations, we rely
on Table C of European Commission (2005). The EC distinguishes 8 types of social protection
expenditures (both in cash and in kind), which we assign to the old and young generations. The
‘old age’ expenditures are completely assigned to the old generation. ‘Sickness’, ‘Survivors’,
‘Housing’ and ‘Other’ are assigned 50-50 to both. The young generation receives beneﬁts for
‘Disability’, ‘Family’ and ‘Unemployment’. The resulting observations for 14 EU-countries
implies a share of old-age transfers between 43% for IRL and 71% for ITA (see
data/eurostat/transfers.xls). Our division of transfers is at the bottom tail of this distribution.
Taxing corporate income τπ and δt Key parameters of the corporate income tax are the legal
tax rate τπ and the ﬁscal depreciation rate δt measuring the broadness of the tax base. The legal
35tax rates are taken from IFS, except for CZE, HUN and POL (source: Finkenzeller and Spengel
(2004)) and DNK (source: Nexia International (2005)). Starting point in the calibration of the
tax base is the METR as calculated for debt and equity ﬁnancing by Devereux et al. (2002). We
assume that 25% of the new investment projects are ﬁnanced with debt and 75% with equity.24
This is lower than the actual debt-equity mix (40,60) in order to ensure reasonable (depreciation)
allowances. In the calibration, we set δt such that this METR is reproduced25, but we restrict the
ﬁscal depreciation rate to26
δt ∈ [δk,δk +0.10]
Imposing the maximum value is motivated as follows. When one allows for generous
depreciation allowances (large difference between δt and δk), simulating a reduction in the
corporate tax rate might result in an increase in the cost of capital and a reduction of the capital
stock (i.e. the taxation paradox). We avoid this undesirable outcome by restricting the value of
δt.27
Figure 2.9 shows that countries with a high tax rate have generally a smaller tax base.
A drawback of this calibration procedure is that the simulated tax revenues correlate poorly
(−0.3) with the observed tax revenues (as share of GDP), as shown in Figure 2.10. The mean
revenues are lower in the model on average (2.6% versus 3.0%).28 In an alternative procedure,
we calibrated δt on the observed corporate tax revenues. However, this resulted in implausible
high values for δt, that would give rise to a negative response of the capital stock to a reduction
in the corporate tax rate.
Taxing household wealth The tax rates on income from dividends, interest and capital gains
are taken from Ernst and Young (2000) as given in Lorié (2000). Some countries adopt an
24 Devereux et al. (2004) calculates average METR’s using a 35% weight on debt and 65% weight on equity.
25 The parameter δt should be interpreted broader than the ﬁscal depreciation rate. It captures all allowances (besides
interest expenditures) that are assumed to be proportional to the capital stock.
26 This restriction is binding for Greece (at the upper bound) and Germany and Ireland (at the lowerbound).
27 Only in Greece, the small tax base still implies the taxation paradox, where a tax increase raises investments.
28 Especially for Germany, the calibration choice matters: it has a highly distortive tax system in terms of the METR, but
one of the lowest tax revenues. Gaëtan Nicodème (European Commission) pointed at the following explanations. First,
about 85% of companies in Germany do not pay corporate taxes. They are rather in the forms of KG and the like and their
owners are liable to personal income tax instead. Second, some data do not contain the trade tax (or gewerbesteuer),
which is a (deductible) regional tax that comes in addition to the CIT rate of 25%. For example, if you look at the structure
of taxation systems publications, this is the difference between table A.2.2_G which is corporate income tax (DE is 0.9%
of GDP in 2004) and table C.3.1.1._G which is taxes on income of corporations (DE is 2.2% in 2004). The difference
being mainly the gewerbesteuer. The drop after the tax reform is due to the possibility for companies to deduct the taxes
they paid previously on retained earnings from the taxes they now pay on distributed dividends. There is also the fact that
most companies had losses to carry forward from bad earlier years.
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imputation system where corporate taxes are (partly) imputed from the dividend tax. These
imputation rates are taken from Sørensen (2001b). We have subtracted from the original
dividend tax rate the product of the imputation rate and the corporate income tax rate. We
37assume that income from assets is only taxed in the country of residence, such that
τb(i, j) = τd (i, j) = τg(i, j) = 0, i 6= j.





whereC is household consumption (including taxes). The tax revenue data come from OECD
Revenue Statistics, with
5110 General taxes on goods and services
5121 Excise taxes
Expression (2.8) is a simpliﬁcation of Mendoza et al. (1994, (5)) and Carey and Tchilinguirian
(2000, (14)). Figure 2.11 shows that the resulting tax rates follow closely the tax rates calculated
by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000, Table 4).
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TAXBEN(2002) OECD(1991-97)






38ωL labor income share, as calculated in (2.6)
W compensation of employees
WSE imputed wage sum of self-employed, see (2.5)
1100 Taxes on income, proﬁt and capital gains of individuals or households
2000 Total social security contributions
3000 Taxes on payroll and workforce
This expression is similar to Mendoza et al. (1994, (7)) and Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000,
(12)). Figure 2.12 compares our calculated tax rates for 2002 with the corresponding numbers
for 1991-1997 in Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000, Table 4).
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43A Additional tables with model variables and equations
Table A.1 List of parameters and exogenous variables
Symbol1 Description GAMS Dimension2
αq share parameter intermediate inputs alfa_q m
αl weight of leisure in utility alfa_f 1
αs share parameter in savings composite alfa_s m
α
d,m,f
v share parameter of value-added alfa_v m∗3
α
d,m,f
vk share parameter capital in value-added alfa_vk m∗3
δk depreciation rate of capital delta_k 1
εb scale parameter in marginal distress eps_b m
εq elasticity of marginal cost of distorting transfer prices eps_q m
on capital gains for domestic investor
ρo utility weight of old generation rho_o m
ρu rate of time preference rho_u 1
σl intratemporal substitution elasticity sigma_l 1
σs substitution elasticity bonds/equities sigma_s 1
σu intertemporal substitution elasticity sigma_u 1
σ
d,m,f
v substitution elasticity labour/capital sigma_v 3
χ0 elasticity of marginal cost of ﬁnancial distress chi_0 m
ωd share in ﬁxed factor of domestic ﬁrms omega_d m
ωm,f share in ﬁxed factor of multinationals omega_m m∗m
ωn relative population size omega_n m∗m
ωy share of age cohort in young population share_t T
A0 productivity level A_0 m
ga productivity growth rate g_a 1
gn population growth rate g_n 1
gy GDP growth rate g_y 1
Ny,No size of young/old generation N m∗2
ˆ rwb world rate of return on bonds rw_b 1
ˆ rwe world rate of return on equities rw_e 1
T cohort length T 1
1 superscripts d, m, f refer to domestic ﬁrms, multinationals and foreign subsidiaries.
2 m denotes the number of countries
44Table A.2 List of government parameters and variables
Symbol Description GAMS Dimension
τc tax rate on household consumption tau_c m
τl tax rate on labour income tau_l m
try,o lump-sum transfers tr m∗2
τπ tax rate on corporate income tau_p m
τbr total tax rate by residence country on interest income tau_br m∗m
τbs total tax rate by source country on interest income tau_bs m∗m
τdr total tax rate by residence country on dividends tau_dr m∗m
τds total tax rate by source country on dividends tau_ds m∗m
τ
imp
d imputation rate on dividends tau_d_imp m
τgr total tax rate by residence country on capital gains tau_gr m∗m
τgs total tax rate by source country on capital gains tau_gs m∗m
βb deductible fraction of corporate interest payment beta_b m
δt depreciation rate of capital for tax purposes delta_t 1
L ratio between tax factor on dividends and tax factor on capital gains theta_e m
ωg share of government consumption in GDP omega_g m
¯ dg government debt as share of GDP g_debt m
45Table A.3 List of endogenous variables
Symbol Description GAMS Dimension
ρb gross after tax return on bond composite rho_b m
ρe gross after tax return on equity composite rho_e m
ρs gross after tax interest rate on total savings rho_s m
πd pure proﬁts pil_d m
πm,f pil_m m∗m
ˆ πd corporate tax base pihl_d m
ˆ πm,f pihl_m m∗m
as household wealth Tassets m
b holdings of bond composite b m
bw net foreign holdings of bonds bw m
bop balance of payments bop m
cy,o consumption of young/old generation c m∗2
cd user cost of capital c_d m
cm,f
cd




cq cost of distorting transfer prices c_q m∗m
ca current account ca m
cv compensating variation cv m
dd depreciation allowances dl_d m
dm,f dl_m m∗m
dd




divd dividends (distributed proﬁts) divl_d m
divmm,mf divl_m m∗m
e holdings of equity composite e m
ew net foreign holdings of equities ew m
ex net exports ex m
fa net foreign assets fa m
fdi foreign direct investment fdi m
kd capital stock kl_d m
km,f kl_m m∗m
ld labour demand l_d m
lm,f l_m m∗m
l labour supply l m
pq price intermediate inputs p_q m∗m
q intermediate inputs q m∗m
46Table A.3 List of endogenous variables (continued)
Symbol Description GAMS Dimension
rd marginal cost of ﬁnance r_d m
rm,f r_m m∗m
¯ re discount rate of ﬁrms rb_e m
s total savings s m
s
y,o
0 savings (net of interest income) s0 m∗2
U utility utility m
vy,o felicity v m∗2
vd value of the ﬁrm vl_d m
vmm,mf vl_m m∗m
vad value-added val_d m
vam,f val_m m∗m
w wage rate w m
yd total output yl_d m
ym,f yl_m m∗m
Y GDP y m
Yd disposable income yd m
47Table A.4 List of equations
















Eq_y_{d, m, f} (1.30), (1.55), (1.62)
Eq_va_{d, m, f} (1.31), (1.57), (1.64)
Eq_l_{d, m, f} (1.41), (1.69), (1.70)
Eq_k_{d, m, f} (1.49), (1.73), (1.74)
Eq_fdi (1.83)
Eq_db_{d, m, f} (1.43)
Eq_cb_{d, m, f} (1.34)
Eq_rb_e (1.54)




Eq_pi_{d, m, f} (1.42), (1.75), (1.76)
Eq_c_d (1.49)
Eq_metr (1.86)
Government Eq_pih_{d, m, f} (1.36), (1.60), (1.66)
Eq_Gov (1.89)





48Table A.5 Equations used to calibrate
Name in GAMS Equation or deﬁnition
Households Eq_defCT (1.21)
Eq_rho_o ρo = 1
Firms Eq_alfa_vk Equal capital-shares between ﬁrms
Eq_wl Wage share
Eq_db Deﬁnition of the average debt-equity ratio
Eq_cb0_d Financial distress costs of domestic ﬁrms in the absence of corporate taxation
Eq_db0_d Debt ratio of domestic ﬁrms in the absence of corporate taxation
Government Eq_tr Fraction between young and old transfers
Eq_cortax Corporate tax revenues
Eq_citrev idem, auxiliary equation
49